REST APIs
Endpoint behavior, HTTP methods, object references, filters, pagination, and response handling, checked for the broken object-level authorization and insecure direct object references that let one account reach another's data.
Manual testing for REST and GraphQL APIs, authorization models, token boundaries, object-level access, tenant isolation, and API-driven business logic.
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Coverage spans REST and GraphQL authorization boundaries, token and scope validation, tenant isolation, response shaping, and valid API actions that can be combined into business logic abuse.
Endpoint behavior, HTTP methods, object references, filters, pagination, and response handling, checked for the broken object-level authorization and insecure direct object references that let one account reach another's data.
Schemas, resolvers, mutations, nested queries, batching, introspection, and field-level exposure, the areas where GraphQL's flexibility most often hides authorization gaps that a REST-focused review would miss.
Login exchanges, session creation, refresh flows, credential recovery, and identity transitions, tested for the weaknesses attackers use to hijack accounts or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Role enforcement, object ownership, action permissions, and cross-user or cross-tenant access, the exact control failures behind most IDOR and BOLA findings in production APIs.
JWT claims, OAuth scopes, signature handling, expiry, audience, and privilege boundaries, so a stolen or over-scoped token can't be replayed into more access than it was ever issued.
Organization boundaries, shared identifiers, tenant context, and data segregation controls, the layer that keeps one customer's data from leaking into another customer's session.
Workflow sequencing, state manipulation, replay, limit bypasses, and unintended product actions, the class of abuse no automated scanner can catch because nothing about it is technically invalid.
Webhooks, partner APIs, service credentials, trust assumptions, and external data paths, since a single overprivileged integration can become a backdoor into the rest of the platform.
Attackers often use legitimate sessions and valid API actions. Risk appears when token scope, object ownership, tenant isolation, or workflow rules are enforced inconsistently across the request path, turning a normal authenticated user into an unintended path to another tenant's data.
Typical findings include excessive data exposure, broken object authorization, scope bypasses, resolver-level GraphQL weaknesses, and business logic abuse that depends on product context.
Object identifiers expose records outside the caller's ownership or tenant boundary, one of the most reported API vulnerabilities year over year and still one of the easiest to miss in code review.
GET /accounts/{id}Queries reveal internal IDs, relationships, hidden fields, or account existence signals, turning a single flexible query into a map of your entire data model.
query user(id)Valid sessions can invoke actions without a matching ownership or policy check, letting an authenticated user modify or delete records that were never theirs.
PATCH /projects/{id}JWT or OAuth permissions allow broader reads, writes, or administrative actions than intended, often because a scope was left overly broad during development and never tightened before launch.
scope: read:*Responses return sensitive fields that the UI does not need and the caller should not receive, leaking internal fields, PII, or credentials to any client that inspects the raw response.
200 response fieldsLegitimate API functions can be sequenced or replayed to bypass product rules and controls, from skipping payment steps to unlocking features a plan tier was never meant to include.
state transitionTenant context is missing, user-controlled, or inconsistently enforced across endpoints, the exact gap that turns a single-tenant bug into a cross-customer data breach.
X-Tenant-IDWebhooks and partner connections trust unsafe input, weak signatures, or overprivileged credentials, giving an attacker a trusted-looking path straight into internal systems.
POST /webhooksEach finding connects endpoint evidence to product risk, with developer-ready remediation, ownership context, and clear retest criteria.
GET /api/v1/accounts/{id}A focused review moves from architecture and role mapping to manual abuse-case testing, evidence-backed reporting, and fix validation.
Define APIs, roles, tenants, environments, and high-risk product workflows, so testing time is spent on what actually matters to your product, not a generic checklist.
Trace schemas, endpoints, identities, trust boundaries, and sensitive data paths, building the same map an attacker would build before deciding where to push.
Run manual authorization, abuse-case, token, GraphQL, and business logic testing by hand, against real roles and real data, not an automated pattern match.
Confirm the exploit path, affected users, tenant reach, and practical impact, so every finding in the report is proven, not theoretical.
Document requests, evidence, reproduction, root cause, and engineering guidance in a format your engineers can act on the same day they receive it.
Verify critical fixes and confirm the vulnerable path is no longer reachable, closing the loop instead of leaving that confirmation to guesswork.
API risk is often hidden in who can call an action, which object they can reference, and how legitimate functions combine across a workflow, exactly the context an automated API security scanner has no way to evaluate.
A concise security deliverable with affected endpoints, exploit evidence, practical fix guidance, and retest criteria for engineering and product stakeholders, so nothing gets lost in translation between the security review and the sprint that fixes it.
Requests, role context, prerequisites, and a reliable path engineers can replay step by step to see the issue for themselves.
Affected users, tenant reach, exposed data, and the product consequence of exploitation, framed in terms the business can act on, not just a CVSS number.
The authorization or workflow failure connecting attacker-controlled input to impact, laid out as the same chain an attacker would follow.
Practical control recommendations aligned to the endpoint, resolver, or permission model, written for the engineer who has to ship the fix.
Clear verification criteria and confirmation notes for remediated high-risk findings, so nothing is marked closed until it's actually closed.
Findings ordered by reachability, exploitability, data sensitivity, and customer impact, not a generic severity label copied from a scanner.
Watch how a quote actually gets built: each real factor is weighed in sequence, ending on how pricing is decided, not a flat number pulled from a rate card.
A side by side pace comparison, not to say automation is worthless, but to show exactly where it stops and manual review has to take over.
Answers for teams reviewing REST APIs, GraphQL APIs, authorization boundaries, tenant isolation, and API-driven product risk.
API security testing reviews how requests, tokens, roles, object references, and workflows behave when abused by authenticated or unauthenticated users.
Yes. Reviews can cover REST endpoints, GraphQL queries and mutations, resolver behavior, token scopes, object-level access, and excessive data exposure.
API testing focuses deeply on request-level trust boundaries, authorization checks, object ownership, tenant isolation, and machine-readable workflows that scanners often miss.
Common findings include IDOR/BOLA, broken object authorization, token scope failures, GraphQL enumeration, excessive data exposure, and business logic abuse.
You receive validated findings with affected endpoints, role context, reproduction steps, impact analysis, fix guidance, and retest criteria.
Validate authorization, tenant isolation, object access and the API paths that could expose customer data.